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Mineral Lease Division Revisited—An Old Doctrine
with New Applications
Randall S. Davidson∗
Andrew D. Martin∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In Louisiana, mineral leases have been considered a form of
interest in real property from a very early date.1 As such, courts
consistently held that the mineral lease was indivisible.2
Additionally, under pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence, courts
universally allowed lessees to assign all or part of their interest in a
lease to another party.3 These transactions could, and often did,
appear in the form of assignments of the working interest for
discrete acreage portions comprising less than all of the originally
leased premises.4
The notion of indivisibility presented a problem, however, when
lessees assigned only a part of their interest in a lease to another
party. Since the obligations were not divided, the assignor faced the
possibility of damages (or even lease cancellation) based on default
under the lease by the partial assignee—and not through any fault of
his own. For example, a partial assignee to ten acres of a 100-acre
lease might fail to pay the delay rentals due under the lease without
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1. Thomas A. Harrell, A Mineral Lessee’s Obligation to Explore
Unproductive Portions of the Leased Premises in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 387,
388–89 (1991).
2. Id.; see also Murray v. Barnhart, 42 So. 489 (La. 1906). Since its effective
date in 1975, the Mineral Code has carried forth this principle by providing that
leases are, in general, indivisible. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 (2000).
3. For an early case which discusses partial lease assignment, see Smith v.
Sun Oil, 165 La. 907 (1928).
4. At the outset, the authors wish to disclose that they have asserted lease
division issues in pending litigation seeking cancellation of pre-Mineral Code
leases in behalf of lessors under those leases. Nevertheless, the topic deserves
serious discussion. Our “issue bias” is no greater than the views of other lawyers
who routinely represent oil and gas companies or others who receive consulting or
similar fees to assert the industry position on the lease division issue as expert
witnesses.
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notice to the original lessee. If the lease obligations were truly
indivisible, then the assignor who retained 90 acres could face
cancellation as to his portion of the lease as well.
The concept and practice of lease division emerged from this
basic problem. It has since evolved into a complex, and sometimes
confusing, topic of mineral law in Louisiana. More particularly, the
effect of a lease’s division on its express and implied obligations is
not always clear. This Article’s goal is to trace the historical
development of lease division, set out issues not entirely settled at
present, and suggest possible solutions to these problems.
When a lease, subject to division by assignment under
appropriate lease covenants, is assigned in part, we believe the lease
becomes divided, in practical effect, into two leases for purposes of
lease maintenance. Lease language that protects the lessee of a
divided lease from liability for the failures of his assignee should
likewise prevent him from benefitting from the maintenance or
exploration activities of that assignee. The benefits and burdens of
the lease should simply apply separately. Further, because lease
division is fundamentally a creature of contract, a lease can be
divided in any manner specified by the language of the lease:
vertically, horizontally, or even by substance.
II. HISTORY: PRE-MINERAL CODE JURISPRUDENCE
Arguably, the most important case in the history of lease
division is Swope v. Holmes, decided by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in 1929.5 In Swope, the lessor sought partial cancellation of a
2,500-acre mineral lease as to a 440-acre section.6 The rights to
these 440 acres were transferred from the lessee through a series of
assignments to the defendant.7 The defendant subleased some of this
acreage but eventually permitted his sublessees to cease their
operations.8 Though the lease acreage outside the 440-acre tract was
productive, no production was obtained from the defendant’s 440acre tract.9 The lease in question contained the following provision:
It is hereby agreed that in the event this lease shall be
assigned as to part or as to parts of the above described
lands, and the assignee or assignees of such part or parts
shall fail or make default in the payment of the proportionate
part of the rents due from him or them, such default shall not
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929).
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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operate to defeat or affect this lease in so far as it covers a
part or parts of said lands upon which said lessee or
assignee thereof shall make due payment of said rental.10
While the court did not expressly say that this language divided the
lease upon assignment, the court rejected the defendant’s argument
that production from other parts of the lease kept the entire lease in
force.11 The court’s rationale was simple: the annual rental due
under the lease was not paid as to the 440-acre tract in question.12
The clause quoted above mutually exculpated the assignor, and any
partial assignees, from the defaults of the others in non-payment of
these rentals.13 In insulating each partial working interest owner of
the lease from the rental defaults of the other, this provision allowed
for partial termination of the lease; effectively, portions of the lease
were cancelled when the required proportionate rentals were not
paid for those parts of the lease.14
Swope was followed two years later by Roberson v. Pioneer Gas
Co.15 The lease in Roberson contained an essentially identical clause
to the lease provision in Swope, which provided that, in the event
that one partial holder of the lease defaulted in its rental payments,
any other partial holder would not be faced with cancellation of his
portion of the lease.16 The court in Roberson first decided that the
transaction at issue qualified as an assignment, as opposed to a
sublease.17 Had the transaction been a sublease, it would not have fit
the express lease language providing for exculpation in the event
that a part of the lease was “assigned.”18 Upon deciding this, the
court stated:
The effect of the assignment of the lease on the 40 acres of
land . . . was to divide the original lease into two leases, by
making a lease between the plaintiffs, as lessors . . . and
Pipes & Mack, as their lessees, under the terms and
conditions stipulated in the original lease. What Pipes &
Mack did, or failed to do, to keep their lease in force on the
40 acres of land, could not affect the lease which the Pioneer
Gas Company retained on the remaining 85 acres of land.19
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Roberson thus articulated the modern conceptual picture of a
divided lease: the divided acreage portions should be thought of as
separate leases containing the terms and conditions of the original
lease. What keeps the lease in force on one divided tract will not
maintain the lease for other divided tracts.
The clauses in Swope and Roberson both dealt specifically with
partial assignments of the lease.20 Louisiana is peculiar among states
in its emphasis on the distinction between an assignment and a
sublease in the mineral law context. Thorough explanations of the
evolution of this dichotomy are available from many sources.21 In
brief, the difference is that, in a sublease, the transferor retains
something in the transferred interest; whereas, in an assignment, the
transferor hands over the entirety of his interest.22 For example, in
Smith v. Sun Oil Co.,23 a transfer of a lease interest was classified as
a sublease, as the assignor retained an overriding royalty and right of
reversion in the transaction.24 These particular retained interests are
not the only ones that will render a particular transfer a “mere”
sublease; rather, the lessee need only to retain some interest that
runs for the life of the lease.25 Conversely, not all retained interests
are significant enough to constitute a sublease when, on the facts,
the court concludes an assignment was intended.26
A consequence of this dichotomy in the lease division context
was that leases that allowed for division in the event of an
assignment were not adjudged to be divided when the transfer at
issue was determined to be a sublease.27 Though this approach has
been criticized as overly formalistic,28 it is clearly a part of the
jurisprudence.
However, a 1929 Louisiana Supreme Court case, Johnson v.
Moody, raised the possibility of lease division by sublease, rather
than assignment.29 In Johnson, that is exactly what happened: a
transfer of a particular lease interest was classified as a sublease
20. Id. at 47; Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131, 132 (La. 1929).
21. See e.g., Stevia M. Walther, Overrides, Assignments, and Subleases, in 8
LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE, (Patrick H. Martin ed. 2012).
22. LA. MIN. CODE art. 127 cmt. (2000).
23. Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379 (La. 1928).
24. Id. at 384.
25. LA. MIN. CODE art. 127 cmt. (2000).
26. See, e.g., Dore Energy Corp. v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 997 So. 2d 826,
829 (La. App. Ct. 2008).
27. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. at 380.
28. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW § 414 (LexisNexis, Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2012)
(1959).
29. Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929).
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rather than an assignment.30 Despite this, the court pointed out that
the contract contained provisions “showing that the lease was not
indivisible, and might be forfeited as to a part only of the land.”31
The court held that the unproductive, undeveloped portions of the
leased land could not be held by production from the subleased
tract.32 The undeveloped property was held to be abandoned.33
Though this decision did not explicitly declare that a sublease did
divide the lease in question, it suggests that such a result is possible.
Subsequent pre-Mineral Code cases tended to follow the basic
theoretical guidelines set by Swope and Roberson, and some took on
the more expansive view of Johnson. For instance, one 1952 case
referred to the availability of many clauses which could operate to
divide a lease:
Practically every modern oil and gas lease has several
provisions under which the lessee, at its option, may
“divide” the lease; perhaps the oldest and most common is
the provision that the lease may be assigned in whole or in
part, and in the event of assignment as to a segregated
portion of the land, default by one leasehold owner will not
affect the rights of any other.34
This body of case law established the basic proposition that a
mineral lease could be rendered divisible by appropriate contractual
language. The typical triggering language was a clause that provided
for “mutual exculpation” for holders of the lessee’s interest in the
event of a partial assignment, but other types of lease provisions
were also held to allow for lease division. If the mineral in question
was divided by lease provisions or assignment covenants—or
both—that lease would then be considered as two (or more) separate
leases to be maintained separately, even though each contained all of
the terms and conditions of the original lease. This included
extension of the term of the divided segments by operations or
production.
III. MINERAL CODE
In 1974, the legislature enacted the Louisiana Mineral Code in
Title 31 of the Revised Statutes, effective January 1, 1975. The
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
added).

Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952) (emphasis
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Mineral Code carried forward the prior law allowing the lessee to
subdivide or assign the lease in whole or in part, codifying this rule
in Mineral Code article 127. The Code then expressly addresses the
issue of lease division in article 130, which states plainly: “[a]
partial assignment or partial sublease does not divide a mineral
lease.”35 Unlike the prior case law, the article makes clear that a
partial assignment does not, by itself, divide a mineral lease.36
However, the Comment to article 130 recognizes the pre-Mineral
Code jurisprudence allowing division when there is a lease clause
providing for such, stating:
There are several cases dealing with partial assignments of
leases containing a clause permitting assignment in whole or in part
and providing that in the case or a partial assignment failure of an
assignee to make payment of his proportionate part of the rentals
will not result in termination as to the remainder of the lease. . . . In
all of these, the court has held that such a clause makes a lease
divisible so that when there is a partial assignment, there are two
leases with different sets of rights and obligations between lessor
and lessee. Not only will this be true as to the rental obligation, it is
true also of the effect of drilling or production on maintenance of the
lease. The unarticulated premise of these cases is that in the absence
of such provisions the lease would be indivisible in the sense that a
partial assignment would not have the effect of creating two leases
where but one existed before. It is therefore correct to say that
[a]rticle 130 reflects established law insofar as assignments are
concerned.37
Thus, the default rule of article 130—that a mineral lease is not
divided by assignment—is open to alteration by the parties to a
lease.38 Such modification is permissible under Mineral Code article
3, which states, “[u]nless expressly or impliedly prohibited from
doing so, individuals may renounce or modify what is established in
their favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or
modification does not affect the rights of others and is not contrary
to the public good.”39 The explicit recognition in the Comment to
article 130 of pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence (specifically, those
cases concerning leases containing language of divisibility) makes it
clear that such language is not contrary to the public good, and

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 (2000).
Id.
LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 cmt. (2000).
Id.
LA. MIN. CODE art. 3 (2000).
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leasing parties are not, therefore, expressly or impliedly prohibited
from using language modifying the rule of article 130.40
The Comment to Mineral Code article 130 also asserted that
article 130 sustained pre-Code jurisprudence limiting lease division
under the standard divisibility language to assignments, rather than
subleases. The Comment to article 130 states: “[a]s to the effect of a
partial sublease, it is, again, consonant with the theory concerning
the nature of the sublease to conclude that a partial sublease has no
divisive effect.”41 However (with due respect to authors of the
Comment), that statement is not categorically true. Consistent with
the principle of Mineral Code article 3, parties are free to add
language to their lease allowing for a sublease that divides the rights
and obligations of the sublessor and sublessee.42 Such a division was
at least impliedly deemed possible in Johnson v. Moody,43 and
nothing in the language of article 130 evidences a desire to overrule
this result.
The present Civil Code articles regarding the divisibility of
obligations support the important pre-Mineral Code lease division
decisions.44 By stipulating that the lessee and his transferee are not
liable for each other’s defaults, the assignability clauses in these
cases contracted out of the Civil Code’s suppletive rules on
solidarity.45 Civil Code article 1818 states that “[a]n indivisible
obligation with more than one obligor or obligee is subject to the
rules governing solidary obligations.”46 Expanding on this notion,
Civil Code article 1819 declares: “[a]n indivisible obligation may
not be divided among the successors of the obligor or of the obligee,
who are thus subject to the rules governing solidary obligors or
solidary obligees.”47
The assignability provisions, which relieve the transferor or
transferee of a lease interest for the fault of the other on the assigned
portion, clearly cut off solidarity.48 As such, the obligations of the
lease are rendered divisible. Allowing for the insulation of the
transferor and transferee for the default of the other by way of the
40. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 cmt.
41. LA. MIN. CODE art. 130.
42. LA. MIN. CODE art. 3.
43. Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929).
44. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1818, 1819 (2013).
45. See, e.g., Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929); Roberson v. Pioneer
Gas Co. 137 So. 46 (La. 1931).
46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1818.
47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1819 (emphasis added).
48. See id.; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1818. If the lease obligations remained
solidary, then there obviously would be no division; that is, each party would
remain liable for the defaults of the others.
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assignability clause, but permitting the performance of the lease
covenants by one to count for the other, would result in a curious
asymmetrical result clearly not contemplated by the Mineral Code
or Civil Code.
In sum, the Mineral Code settled many of the existing questions
regarding what was required to divide a lease. The law in effect for
leases executed after 1975 is that a mineral lease is—in the absence of
special contractual covenants regarding divisibility—indivisible.49
However, as mentioned above in the discussion concerning Mineral
Code article 130, the parties to the lease can alter this rule by
including specific language authorizing division. Whether (and to
what extent) a lease is divided is dependent on the language of the
lease.50 When a lease is divided, the lessee’s obligations applicable to
the lease should inure to each tract separately; a partial assignor or
assignee’s failure to meet these obligations will not endanger the lease
rights of the other parties. However, the assignor and assignee should
not be allowed to rely on performance by one to hold the lease
interest of the other.
Though the conclusions we draw above rest upon established
principles of Louisiana law, a contrary view construes lease division
in a much narrower sense.51 This position emphasizes that every
lease clause should be read against the background of the default
rule of indivisibility in Mineral Code article 130; to get around this
rule, the argument goes, contracting parties must expressly provide
the extent to which a particular lease is divisible.52 This position
argues courts should not infer a total division of lease rights and
obligations from lease clauses that only speak to limited
circumstances.
That Swope, Roberson, and their progeny are pre-Mineral Code
decisions is all the more reason, under this view, to resist broad
interpretations of exculpation clauses that arguably go well beyond
the intent of the contracting parties. Proponents of this position
would argue that, with article 130, the legislature provided a firm
rule for indivisibility that can only be deviated from when parties
explicitly repudiate it.
We agree that lease division is a function of the lease itself. In
the absence of a lease clause providing for a division of lease rights
and obligations upon assignment or sublease, article 130’s rule of
indivisibility holds. However, the jurisprudence clearly indicates
49. LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 cmt. (2000).
50. See id.
51. See id. (noting that Mineral Code art. 130 is “based on the concept that the
lease is indivisible unless otherwise provided by contract.”).
52. Id.
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that certain common lease clauses do imply a total division upon
assignment, such as the Swope and Roberson lease provisions,
quoted above.53 The courts in those cases wisely recognized that
limiting lease division to merely one area yields an array of
inconsistent consequences and uncertain relations between the
relevant parties.54 Again, one must consider that allowing the lessees
to be exculpated from defaults with respect to the interests owned by
the assignee (or retained by the assignor) should also result in
separate lease maintenance obligations to the lessor. The premise is
simple but rests on sound principles of equity. A recent Second
Circuit opinion supports this understanding.55 In Hoover Tree Farm,
L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit noted that the
Roberson court, in its interpretation of the rental payments clause:
[R]uled that a lease containing such provision would be
divided for all purposes into two leases upon the transfer of
the entirety of the leasehold rights to a specific geographical
portion. Such broad interpretation therefore moved the
clause beyond merely the subject of rental payment default
to effect a stringent modification of the typical habendum
clause principle for maintenance of the entire lease beyond
the primary term by the operations and production of one
well.56
Similar clauses providing for such divisibility are widely employed
in mineral leases today, and their basic effect is almost unquestioned
by modern courts. There are a variety of open questions, however,
relating to lease division that still demand judicial resolution.
IV. UNANSWERED LEASE DIVISION ISSUES
A. Horizontal Lease Division
One question still undecided is that of horizontal lease division.
In all the cases mentioned above, the leases were divided along a
vertical plane; to state it differently, assignor and assignee were in
each case responsible for the lease obligations under discrete surface
acreage. In contrast, the assignor and partial assignee of a lease
53. Other decisions which recognize total division include: Noel Estate, Inc.
v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Bond v. Midstates Oil Corp., 53 So. 2d 149
(La. 1951); Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336 (La. 1940); Odom v. Union
Producing Co., 129 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 1961), aff'd, 141 So. 2d 649 (1961).
54. Id.
55. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., 63 So. 3d 159 (La.
Ct. App. 2011).
56. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
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divided along a horizontal axis would own lease interests as to
discrete subsurface acreage. Such division ostensibly occurs when a
lessee makes an assignment of only certain depths covered by the
lease; for example, “all those depths below 5,000 feet”; or, “down to
the base of Formation X.”
These sorts of depth-limited partial assignments are quite
common and are motivated by similar considerations as instances of
vertical division. A particular lessee-assignor may be faced with
certain limitations, either technological or financial, which make it
unable to exploit the deeper intervals of the lease. In such a
situation, a partial assignment of the lease (which would yield the
deeper zones to a more sophisticated, well-financed operator) might
make sense. Similarly, the lessee-assignor may believe the shallower
depths of the lease are “played-out” and may consider receiving
some money from an ambitious operator, who is willing to further
develop the shallow zones, preferable to simply abandoning these
intervals and getting nothing for them. Finally, a lessee-assignor
may make an assignment of only a subsurface interval covering
specific target formations; for example, an assignment of the
Haynesville Shale Formation. Again, different opinions regarding
the continued feasibility of a particular zone or horizon, including
the economic and technological limitations of exploiting certain
plays already mentioned, might motivate an assignment covering
only a defined subsurface interval.
A threshold question is whether an assignment of only certain
depths underlying a lease even represents an “assignment” which
could result in division at all, or is merely a sublease. Though we
argue a sublease can divide a lease in situations where specific lease
language allows such a division,57 the more common assignability
clause only contemplates division for an actual assignment. If an
“assignment” of only specific subsurface depths is always found to
be a sublease, then, as a practical matter, the vast majority of leases
are not divisible horizontally, which does not does not reflect the
intent of many of these assignments and thus does not follow
logically from the basic principles of lease division. The inquiry
should focus on the division of obligations of the lessee and what
rights the assignor retains; the issue should not be resolved simply
by the assignor’s reservation of an overriding royalty or the
retention of other depth intervals.58 However, the Second Circuit in

57. See supra Part II.
58. See id; Dore Energy Corp. v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 997 So. 2d 826, 829
(La. Ct. App. 2008); Hoover Tree Farm, 63 So. 3d at 174.
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Hoover Tree Farm seemed to assume (perhaps in dictum) that
assignment of a specific depth interval would not divide a lease.59
The argument that an “assignment” of certain depth intervals is
more properly classified as a sublease that, in general, does not
divide a lease is well articulated in Scurlock v. Getty Oil,60 a Third
Circuit case from 1973. In that case, the court found that a particular
partial transfer of interests in two mineral leases—a transfer that
covered only the lease rights in a particular unit and only as to a
particular formation—was a sublease, rather than an assignment.61
The court made this determination partly on account of the fact that
the assignor retained some rights as to the assigned property;
namely, the rights to use the surface of the property, the right to drill
through the assigned stratum, and the right to benefit from the
payment of delay rentals by the assignee.62 The majority opinion
went on to state that the leasing parties did not contemplate
horizontal segregation of the lease by the lessee.63
The opinion in Scurlock did not rule out the possibility of a
horizontal division of the lease under different facts, stating that
such a result was conceivable under some circumstances.64 The
court did not specify, however, what would be required for
horizontal division in this counterfactual. On appeal, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the outcome of the case, but it did not reach
the question of horizontal division in doing so.65 Justice Barham’s
concurrence, though, maintained that the majority opinion
necessarily presupposed that the leases were divided: “[t]hus it is
necessary to determine that there can be a horizontal segregation of
a mineral lease. In my opinion it has been so determined. In my
opinion it has been correctly determined.”66
The dissent in the appellate panel’s Scurlock decision observed
that the assignor in that case did not retain any rights under the lease
59. Hoover Tree Farm, 63 So. 3d at 175 n.18 (“The Transfer in this case,
creating ownership in indivision to the Deep Rights, is not such a transfer of
leasehold rights in a specific geographic portion of the Lease, like the two
transfers at issue in Sun Oil and Roberson. As such, the Transfer did not implicate
the provision of paragraph 10 of the Lease . . . concerning partial lease default and
a possible lease division.”). It is crucial to note, however, that the transfer in this
case was to 50% of the deep rights in the leased property, rather than all of the
interest as to those depths.
60. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 278 So. 2d 851 (La. Ct. App. 1973),
rev’d in part, 294 So. 2d 810 (La. 1974).
61. Id. at 854.
62. Id. at 857.
63. Id. at 858.
64. Id. at 856.
65. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 294 So. 2d 810, 819 (La. 1974).
66. Id. at 821 (Barham, J., concurring).
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as to the land conveyed.67 Just as a partial assignment of the lease as
to discrete surface acreage does not entail that the assignor retains a
right in the property assigned (in that case, the assignor necessarily
retains only what was not included in the assignment), an
assignment of certain depths under a lease assignment clause does
not involve a retention of any rights as to those depths.68
The majority’s argument, that both assignor and assignee would
have rights to use the surface, is susceptible to this critique as well.
The assignor, in that case, did not retain rights to the assigned
depths—the rights to the surface were not kept out of the transfer,
away from the assignee’s control, in the sense that an overriding
royalty interest might be.69 Similarly unpersuasive is the argument
that the ability to drill through the assigned stratum represents some
retention of rights; rather, the right to drill through those depths
springs not only out of the original lease, but also from the doctrine
of correlative rights.70
The claim that the initial parties to the lease did not intend it to
be divisible by a horizontal segregation is more interesting but
ultimately no more tenable. By the plain language of the typical
assignability clauses, like those quoted above in previous sections of
this Article, it appears that most leases simply are divisible by the
partial assignment of certain depths. When the words of a contract
are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further
interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.71 An
assignment of the lease rights below 5,000 feet, for example, is an
assignment of a “part or parts” of the lease. On the other hand, if the
lease clause providing for division mentions only segregated surface
portions of the property, then the lease may not be divided by depth.
The effect of the non-payment of delay rentals by one of the
parties is potentially problematic. If a party with rights as to the
shallow depths fails to pay delay rentals, could the party with rights
to the lower depths face forfeiture? Is the “burden on the lessee”
increased if the holders of the shallow and the deep rights are each
required to pay the full amount of delay rentals?72 In the most
commonly encountered lease forms assignment clause, once the
assignor signs away his lease interest as to a particular depth, he is
not liable for the obligations allocable to that interval, nor is he

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Scurlock, 278 So. 2d at 863.
Id.
See id. at 857–58.
See LA. MIN. CODE art. 11 (2000).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2046 (2013).
See infra Part V.B.
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required to pay any more than he would have before the
assignment.73
In sum, the rationale allowing for lease division by an
assignment of segregated surface portions of the lease would
logically apply equally to assignments of discrete subsurface depths.
A typical partial transfer of the lease rights to certain depths or a
certain formation—where the assignor retains nothing substantial in
those depths—should be properly categorized as an “assignment” as
that term is understood in Louisiana. Decisions from other
jurisdictions endorse the concept of horizontal lease division.74 If
and when the Louisiana Supreme Court considers the issue, it
should be decided similarly.
B. Division by Substance
An even more uncertain area of lease divisibility is the
possibility of a lease that is divided by substance type. Mineral
lessees rarely assign out their lease rights to either oil or gas under
the leased property. If such an assignment operated to divide the
lease rights and obligations, the assignor and partial-assignees would
be confronted with many of the lease division issues discussed in
sections of this Article above. For instance, if an assignment of “all
gas rights” under a given lease resulted in a division between those
gas rights and the oil and other mineral rights under the lease,
production of oil alone from the leased premises might not maintain
the lease as to the gas rights, and vice versa. The lease might then
terminate as to these rights, and the lessor would be free to re-lease
the property for gas exploration.75
This issue is purely speculative at the moment. We know of no
reported Louisiana case where the divisibility by mineral substance
was at issue. The division by substance in an assignment is rare and
will likely continue to be rare. As has been stated several times in
this Article, lease divisibility in Louisiana is dependent on language
73. The M.L. Bath LA. Special 540-R1 form states: “[t]he rights of either
party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part, and the provisions hereof
shall extend to the heirs, successors, assigns and sublessees of the parties hereto,
but no change or division in ownership of the land, rentals or royalties however
accomplished shall operate to enlarge the obligations or diminish the rights of
Lessee.”
74. See also John H. Tucker, Jr., Sub-lease and Assignment, Some of the
Problems Resulting from the Distinction, LA. STATE UNIV. THIRD ANNUAL INST.
ON MINERAL LAW 196 (1955); W.R. Niblack, Some Consequences of Horizontal
Division of Oil and Gas Leaseholds, 8 ANNUAL ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1
(1963).
75. See LA. MIN. CODE arts. 115, 133 (2000).
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in the lease authorizing division. Thus, the lease is only divisible to
the extent provided for by lease; that is, a lease is divisible only
where the lease’s language allows, and by no more. If the lease
providing for division references the assignment of a “segregated
portion,” (or words of similar meaning of the leased premises) as
many lease forms do, the possibility of a division of the lease by
mineral type would arguably be foreclosed. Though oil and gas are,
in reality, sometimes found in different horizons, the “segregation”
in an assignment of gas rights does not necessarily happen along a
physical plane. A clause allowing for division by substance would
have to be sufficiently clear that the lease is to be divided by
assignment of specific minerals.
Another issue that might present further practical limitation on
the possibility of a division by substance type is the assignmentsublease dichotomy discussed above. A partial assignee of a lease
limited to a particular substance might argue that an “assignment” of
a type of mineral represents a sublease, as the assignor is retaining
the remaining minerals in the transaction. Though an obvious
response would be that the assignor is giving over all rights he holds
in that mineral, the point remains that the assignor is retaining rights
in the same lease acreage.
Though there do not appear to be any mineral lease cases on
point, an analogue to the pre-Mineral Code lease division
framework may exist in the context of a mineral servitude. In
Continental Group v. Allison,76 the Louisiana Supreme Court
decided that, under pre-Mineral Code law, a mineral servitude could
prescribe as to only one of the minerals it covered, in the absence of
production of that mineral.77 Under the facts of Allison, the servitude
holders never mined the servitude for lignite, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court ultimately held that their right to explore for that
mineral had prescribed for ten years non-use.78 This result would not
occur today for servitudes created after adoption of the Mineral
Code; article 40 provides that an interruption of prescription applies
to all types of minerals covered by “the act creating the servitude.”79
No comparable provision in the Mineral Code covers mineral leases.
Additionally, the case law is extensive in holding a lease is
fundamentally a creature of contract between the lessor and lessee
and thus is subject to a different set of rules than those governing

76.
77.
78.
79.

Continental Grp., Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 438.
LA. MIN. CODE art. 40 (2000).
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servitudes.80 However, one may logically envision a similar result in
a suit for a breach of lease obligations under a divided-by-substance
lease, such as the result given in Allison: a cancellation of the lease
limited to the assigned and undeveloped mineral substance.81 This
outcome would allow a party that holds the producing oil rights to a
certain lease to be shielded from any breach by the holder of the
rights to produce gas. It would also permit a lessor to free up a
portion of his mineral rights if one of the substances was not being
adequately exploited after an assignment of that mineral.
In any case, discussion of the effects of a breach of a lease
covenant in a divided-by-substance lease necessarily remains merely
academic until an intrepid lawyer advances a case involving a lease
with divided substances. Such a case would need sufficiently broad
language in the lease assignability clause to reasonably implicate a
specific mineral substance.82 Even then, it might be argued that such
a division by substance was a sublease, and thus, the drafting parties
did not contemplate separate lease maintenance by mineral. Despite
this, there appear to be some compelling reasons for recognizing
such a division. For example, a lessor should be able to avoid having
his lease rights to a certain substance maintained by production of
other substances by other parties, effectively removing some
minerals from commerce indefinitely. If a lessee holding rights to
only one mineral or minerals could avoid negative consequences
flowing from a failure of the other lessee party to develop the
assigned minerals, then it follows that the lease should be considered
legally divided by substance.
V. LEASE DIVISION AND EXPRESS LEASE COVENANTS
A. Habendum Clause
No great controversy exists as to the effect of lease division on
the most important of the express lease covenants: the habendum
clause. An assignor and a partial assignee of a divided lease must
separately secure production from the leased tract for which they are
80. See Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (La. 1999) (stating
that mineral leases are construed as leases generally and that the provisions of the
Civil Code applicable to ordinary leases, when pertinent, are applied to mineral
leases). On the other hand, mineral servitudes are more tightly regulated. See LA.
MIN. CODE art. 21−79 (2000).
81. Allison, 404 So. 2d at 438.
82. For instance, language stating: “in the event of an assignment of the lease
as to any interest therein, the lease rights and obligations shall be apportioned
among the several leasehold owners and default by one shall not affect the rights
of the others,” might be sufficiently broad enough.
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responsible or pay the appropriate rentals directly to the lessor if
delay rentals are due.83 The failure of the one does not result in
forfeiture of the lease by the other, and production from one does
not maintain the lease as to the other.84 This is the most common
situation in which lease division is considered today.
Lease division thus operates to contravene the general rule that
production from one part of the lease, even a non-contiguous tract,
will maintain the entirety of the lease. This principle is codified in
Mineral Code article 114.85 By dividing the obligation to maintain a
lease after its primary term by production, lease division actually
goes a step further than the similar effect provided by a Pugh
clause.86 In a divided lease, even production from a contiguous
divided tract will not maintain another segregated tract if the tracts
have been assigned to separate lessees.87
The effect is that a lessor has a relatively straightforward means
of proving a failure of one lessee to live up to the lease conditions;
rather than asserting a failure to develop as to a given portion of the
lease under implied lease covenants—a more significant burden, as
discussed below—the lessor is able to simply provide the production
reports for each assigned tract. If no production is attributable to a
specific assigned and divided tract, the lessor will be able to prove
automatic termination of the lease under the habendum clause,
rather than engaging in a lengthy battle under the implied covenant
to develop.88 Again, if assignors or partial assignees of the lessee’s
interest benefit (in that they are shielded from the failure to develop
83. See, e.g., Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Bond v.
Midstates Oil Corp., 53 So. 2d 149 (La. 1951); Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336
(La. 1940); Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929); Swope v. Holmes, 124 So.
131 (La. 1929); Odom v. Union Producing Co., 129 So. 2d 530 (La. App. Ct. 2d
1961), aff'd, 141 So. 2d 649 (La. 1961).
84. Id.
85. LA. MIN. CODE art. 114 (2000), which states in part: “[a] single lease may
be created on two or more noncontiguous tracts of land, and operations on the land
burdened by the lease or land unitized therewith sufficient to maintain the lease
according to its terms will continue it in force as to the entirety of the land
burdened.”
86. A Pugh clause is a lease provision that operates to divide the lease based
upon the lessee’s development activity on the lease. Under the typical Pugh clause,
off-tract unit production will only maintain that portion of the leased acreage
included within the unit boundaries. A vertical Pugh clause applies the same
principle to the development of the lease by depth intervals and would operate to
release depths below those intervals in production at the expiration of the primary
term of the lease or any extension of the term. See 4 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS §
54:9 (Nancy Saint-Paul ed., 3d ed.) (Westlaw 2012).
87. See, e.g., Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931); Swope v.
Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929).
88. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 133 (2000).

2013]

MINERAL LEASE DIVISION REVISITED

17

other tracts), then separate lease maintenance obligations should
follow. There have not, as yet, been any Louisiana cases holding
that this automatic termination applies in the horizontal division
context. However, if one assumes that such division is possible, it
follows that production from one divided formation or depth interval
will not operate to maintain another formation or interval owned by
another lessee. Any other result would yield a significant logical
inconsistency in the existing theoretical framework of lease division
in the case law.89
B. Delay Rentals
The “mutual exculpation” clauses that gave rise to the concept
of lease division in the first place specifically related to delay
rentals. These clauses were concerned with the effect on the entire
lease of a failure to pay such rentals by a party who was a mere
partial assignee. As a result of Swope and its progeny, the issue is
firmly settled for the classic example of the divided lease: if a lease
containing a mutual exculpation clause is assigned as to discrete
surface acreage, the failure of the assignee to pay the delay rentals
will not result in any forfeiture of the lease for the assignor and vice
versa.90 These rentals are payable in an amount proportional to the
acreage held by each party.91
As highlighted above, the question with regard to a horizontallydivided lease is potentially more difficult. If a lease holds that delay
rentals are $10 an acre and the lease is divided by depth—so that the
assignor and assignee are still under the exact same surface
acreage—how are the rentals to be split up, if at all? If we assume
that both assignor and assignee owe $10 per acre, are we not
increasing the burden under the lease? Such a result would be in
contravention of the typical assignment clause, which states that an
assignment will not enlarge the obligations on the lessee or
assignee.92
The problem may be an illusory one. The burden on the “lessee”
is increased only if we view all partial assignors and partial
assignees collectively as the lessee under the original lease. The
partial assignor has no greater duty, after assignment, in our
hypothetical—he still owes only $10 an acre, just as he would if he
simply released those depths. The partial assignee has the same
89. See supra Part I.
90. See the discussion on Roberson, supra Part II.
91. Id.
92. See Scurlock, supra note 60, at 819 (quoting an example of a typical
assignment clause).
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duty; his obligation has not been increased and is equal to what he
would likely owe if he had independently leased only those depths.
The delay rental obligation is typically tied only to the amount of
surface acreage and is not dependent on the extent of the lessee’s
subsurface rights. Though the lessor’s benefits are now greater, they
are not so because of the increase of any particular burden on the
party with whom he signed the lease. Rather, the partial assignee is
essentially the lessee of a new lease though he is bound under the
same terms and conditions as those contained in the original lease. It
is no more burdensome for either party than if the lessor originally
leased both the shallow and deep rights separately and demanded the
same delay rentals from both lessees.
Three practical considerations should operate to allay concerns
about this issue in a horizontally divided lease. First, the amount due
under most delay rental clauses is very small; a potential partial
assignee will likely not be dissuaded from taking an assignment in
the lease rights as to certain depths because of the possibility of
paying the same amount of delay rentals as was due under the
original lease. Second, most leases are now paid-up leases that do
not contain any provision relating to ongoing delay rentals.93 In
these leases, there is no rental obligation at all, so the problem does
not even arise. Third, lease division issues most often arise after the
expiration of the primary term of the lease at issue, and delay rentals
are not being paid at that point.94
VI.

LEASE DIVISION AND THE IMPLIED COVENANTS

Today, an important part of the lessee’s obligations arises under
article 122 of the Mineral Code. This article codified prior
jurisprudence and states, in part: “[a] mineral lessee is not under a
fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the
contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased
as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself
and his lessor.”95 Thus, the central issue in implied obligations cases
remains whether the lessee has developed and operated the lease
property as a reasonably prudent operator. The breadth of this
standard has allowed courts to tailor remedies to the individual facts
93. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS at 685 (14th ed. 2009) (“A lease effective
during the primary term without further payment of delay rentals, the aggregate of
rentals for the entire primary term having been paid in advance.”).
94. See id. at 231 (“A sum of money payable to the lessor by the lessee for the
privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations or the
commencement of production during the primary term of the lease.”).
95. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 (2000).
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in a range of cases. Courts have, for the most part, wisely rejected
the application of mechanical tests in determining whether a
particular lessee has lived up to the prudent operator standard.96
Despite the statutory openness to individual details afforded by
an expansive standard, the Comment to article 122 asserts a
narrower scope of the duty of lessees to a group of four (possibly
five) implied obligations found in the pre-Code jurisprudence:
In Louisiana, the general obligation to act as a “good
administrator” or “prudent operator” has been clearly
specified in four situations: (1) the obligation to develop
known mineral producing formations in the manner of a
reasonable, prudent operator; (2) the obligation to explore
and test all portions of the leased premises after discovery of
minerals in paying quantities in the manner of a reasonable,
prudent operator; (3) the obligation to protect the leased
property against drainage by wells located on neighboring
property in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator;
and (4) the obligation to produce and market minerals
discovered and capable of production in paying quantities in
the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator.97
Additionally, the Comment mentions the possibility of including a
fifth covenant duty to restore the surface of the leased premises after
the cessation of operations as an implied obligation under article
122.98 However, as will be explained below, this obligation should
no longer be treated as an implied covenant in Louisiana; it is an
express obligation under most lease forms, and the issue is governed
by other statutes.99
With due respect to these Comments, nothing in article 122
purports to limit its scope to the four items mentioned in the
Comments, and we would argue that the legislature, by its broader
language, intended to provide for future developments in our
mineral law to meet new challenges in the industry’s development
and the interface between the lessor and lessee.
A. Exploration and Development
The covenants of exploration and development are closely
related. The Comment to Mineral Code article 122, while itself
listing the obligations separately and noting that Williams and
96.
97.
98.
99.

Harrell, supra note 1, at 406.
LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt. (2000).
Id.
E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2007).
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Meyers makes the same distinction, states that the covenant of
exploration is an “evolutionary offshoot” of the obligation to
develop.100 The connection comes from the fact that both
obligations are essentially about the use of the leased property; the
lease encumbers the minerals under the entire premises, and
therefore, the lessee must explore and then develop the minerals to
the greatest extent practical under the circumstances. If he fails to do
so, the lessor never obtains his main consideration for the contract—
the development and production of any minerals underneath the
leased premises.101
The connection between these obligations and lease division is
perhaps obvious in light of the history of the lease division issue.
Some of the earliest cases regarding lease division dealt with the
failures of assignors or assignees of the lessee’s interest to develop
their respective portions of the lease.102 The courts in those cases
recognized the inequity of cancelling an entire lease because of the
failure of one partial assignee to develop.103 The remedy of partial
cancellation evolved as a response to the problem of a lease that was
only partially developed.104 A court could target those portions of a
lease that had not been adequately explored or developed and leave
the lease untouched as to the remaining acreage. Article 142 of the
Mineral Code explicitly carried this solution forward to the modern
day.105 The practical effect seems to be that whether a lease has been
divided among multiple parties (by assignment, sublease, or
anything else) is irrelevant to a determination of whether a given
portion is subject to a penalty, or perhaps cancellation, for a breach
of the exploration or development covenant. According to Williams
and Meyers:
The availability of decrees of partial cancellation renders
almost academic the problem of the effect on lease
covenants of partial assignments. If a portion of the
leasehold has been adequately explored or developed and
another portion has not, most courts will cancel (at least
100. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt. (citing 5 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, Oil and
Gas Law, ch. 8 (1969)).
101. Carter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948).
102. See the discussion of Roberson and Swope, supra Part II.
103. Id.
104. See Eota Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 74 So. 2d 30, 36 (La. 1954); Carter,
36 So. 2d at 30; Harrell, supra note 1, at 393.
105. LA. MIN. CODE art. 142 (2000) (“A mineral lease may be dissolved
partially or in its entirety. A decree of partial dissolution may be made applicable
to a specified portion of land, to a particular stratum or strata, or to a particular
mineral or minerals.”).
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conditionally) the lease as to the neglected portion of the
leasehold and preserve it as to the other.106
However, the assignments or subleases that divided a mineral lease
may have a great practical effect when it comes to resolving the
following issues: (1) the relief a lessor can obtain; (2) the
determination of the lessor’s most effective legal theory to clear title
to his minerals; and (3) the standards by which a court will
determine whether exploration or development has been adequate.
For one, the boundaries created by assignments that have
divided the lease provide obvious and convenient lines of
demarcation for partial cancellation of such leases for failure to
develop.107 In practice, these demarcations will be obvious because
the different owners of lease interests behave in different ways. The
aggressiveness of one operator on his divided tract or depth interval
may influence a lessor’s decision to bring suit against another
operator on a divided tract or depth interval who is not conducting
operations. In this sense, the internal boundaries within a lease
created by assignment can have significant practical importance.
As mentioned above, a divided lease provides the frustrated
lessor with an additional avenue for relief: automatic termination
under the habendum clause.108 A determination that a lease was
divided, therefore, has great import for the lessor in determining
whether he can proceed under the rather settled issue of whether
there was production from any acreage attributable to the divided
portion of the lease.109 But what of the scenario where old,
marginally productive wells are arguably satisfying held-byproduction status for habendum clause purposes for each divided
section of the lease, but a lessor does not believe the total mineral
resources of the lease are being adequately developed? The
covenants of development and exploration appear straightforward
enough on paper, but in practice, disputes over additional
development covenants will require putting the lessee in default.110
This may be deemed an admission by the lessor that the lease
continues in effect, and an extensive and expensive evidentiary
battle will likely ensue. A single lessor may not have sufficient
resources to engage in such a battle, which may demand expert
testimony on geophysical data, evidence of operations on
neighboring property, and an analysis of expected costs and profits.
106. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 409.4 (LexisNexis, Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2012) (1959).
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
See discussion supra Part V.A.
See Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953).
See LA. MIN. CODE art.136 (2000).
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Additionally, Louisiana places the burden on the lessor to prove a
failure to develop.111
Adding to the lessor’s burden is the fact that the resolution to the
following issue is not entirely clear: What must he, the lessor, prove
has been inadequately developed—the lease as a whole or only a
discrete portion of it? Though the difference may appear to be
semantic, a court adopting the “lease as a whole” approach will
likely view a demand for partial cancellation based on failure to
develop less favorably if all other portions of the leased premises are
adequately developed. The Williams and Meyers treatise discusses
the issue in the following manner:
[W]here there is a question of the degree of diligence
exercised by the partial assignee, partial assignments may
influence the finding or not of breach of covenant. Should
the defendant-partial assignee’s diligence be considered only
in light of what he has done on his premises, or should
reasonable development and exploration be judged on a
lease-wide basis? . . . We are inclined to think . . . the latter
position is sounder. The original lease contemplated
development and exploration on a lease-wide basis. Nothing
in the ordinary lease suggests a different standard after
partial assignments.”112
This view is attractive to the lessee’s position in these disputes, as it
offers a clean, simple, holistic approach to examining lease
exploration and development. However, the view appears to be at
odds not only with the rationale allowing for lease division in the
first place, but also with further development covenants under
Mineral Code article 122. That is, if a clause allowing for divisibility
cuts off solidarity as to the lease obligations—so that the failure or
fulfillment of an obligation on one divided tract is cut off from any
other divided tract—it would seem to follow that the covenants to
explore and develop should likewise be divided and applied
separately. Here, the concept from Roberson is helpful: two new,
different leases are created after division (these leases would cover
two different leasehold interests but maintain the original lease
terms).113 Though the terms of a hypothetical original mineral lease
do contemplate development and exploration on a lease-wide basis,
the division of the lease by assignment should result in these lease
terms being separately applicable to the acreage of each divided
111. Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., 391 So. 2d 485, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1980);
Harrell, supra note 1, at 397.
112. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 106, at § 409.4.
113. See supra note 15.
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tract. As such, it is more consistent to understand the lease
conditions—express and implied—as imposed upon each partial
owner of a lease interest as to, and only as to, the acreage in which
he has rights. The legal result should be two independent leases.114
Just as a partial owner of a lease interest should not be punished for
the failure of another partial owner to explore for or produce
minerals on that other tract, he should not receive the legal benefit
from the overall development of the leased premises if he does not
adequately develop his own tract.
This issue has not been directly addressed in Louisiana.
However, a 1932 case decided by the U.S. Fifth Circuit, Cosden Oil
Co. v. Scarborough,115 provides a good analysis of the problem and
recommends an approach that accords with the one offered in this
Article:
In short, while the lease is entire as to the vesting not only in
the original lessee, but in all of his assigns, of a determinable
fee in each as to the part of the land he owns, that
determinable fee as to each owner stands or falls, is
abandoned or ceases, according to his own acts, subjecting
him to the obligation for damages not at all for what is being
done or not done upon the tract in general, but only for what
he does. Any other construction would lead to interminable
confusion.116
Though Cosden’s rationale has been employed in many other
decisions,117 the approach suggested by Williams and Meyers is
perhaps equally relied upon in case law.118
Framing the scope of the development and exploration
covenants after lease division is similarly problematic when the
division in question occurred along a horizontal plane. Assuming
that such division is possible, a question arises: do we judge the
adequacy of development on the basis of what has been done on all
depths, or do we examine each divided depth interval separately?
Imagine a situation wherein a lessee, A, assigns the lease rights
below 5,000 feet to lessee B. Both tracts are separately maintained
114. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336 (La. 1940).
115. Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932).
116. Id. at 638.
117. E.g., Hull v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1941), rev’d
on other grounds, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hull, 314 U.S. 575 (1941); Standard
Oil Co. v. Giller, 38 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1931); W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil
Co., 19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929).
118. E.g., Heman v. Jefferson, 483 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Kothe v.
Jefferson, 440 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), aff’d and remanded, 455 N.E.2d 73
(Ill. 1983).
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by production, but A’s exploration and development activity as to
the shallow depths are far more extensive than B’s are as to the
deeper zones. Under the approach urged by Williams and Meyers, a
judge faced with determining the adequacy of lease exploration and
development would properly examine the development of the
original leased premises as a whole, rather than treating the upper
depths and lower depths as separate leasehold interests with
individual obligations inuring to each.119 Such an approach mirrors
the asymmetry noted in Section III above, where a party is shielded
from the failures of another holder of part of the lease but shares, to
some extent, in the successes.
This problem is not merely theoretical, as the covenants of
exploration and development extend to each part of the lease, and
partial cancellation of a lease is a recognized remedy for failure to
develop a lease even when leases have not been divided. 120 A lessor
should be able to point out the unexplored or undeveloped portions
of a lease and pray for partial cancellation, regardless of who has the
lease rights to that portion. However, under the contrary position, a
judge looking at the development or exploration of a leased premise
as a whole may frame the issue differently than in the case of a lease
divided by assignment. Adopting the “no division of the lease
obligation” position would seem to stack the deck against lessors.
B. Protection Against Drainage
The duty to protect the leased property against drainage from
adjoining lands is well-established in Louisiana. Early on, courts
determined that lessors could obtain cancellation if their lessees
allowed wells on neighboring tracts to drain the minerals underneath
the leased properties. In Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp.,121 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided that
lessors could also recover damages for the failure to protect against
drainage.122
There is no real change in the application of this duty in the most
common divided lease scenario, where a lease is partially assigned
into discrete surface tracts. If one or both of those tracts is being
drained, the lessor can and should treat each tract as a separate
leasehold and make demand on the lessee who has rights to the tract
actually being drained. If both are being drained, either should be
subject to cancellation or damages for his or her own failure to
119.
120.
121.
122.

See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 106 at § 409.4.
See Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 695 (La. 1959).
Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
Id. at 415.
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perform, though not for the failure of the other.123 If only one party
can prevent the drainage, the other should not be held liable for a
failure to do so. A partial assignee of a horizontally-divided lease
should not be held liable for drainage occurring at a depth he could
not protect—for instance, drainage of gas at 12,000 feet if he only
has the lease rights down to 4,000 feet.
A thornier matter is the issue of drainage from the other divided
tracts. In this instance, a conceptual problem arises if the lessor has
also assigned his interest, so that the lessor’s rights to Tract 1 belong
to one party and Tract 2’s to another. Can the former demand the
drilling of an offset well to prevent drainage by Tract 2? The
Williams and Meyers treatise suggests the answer is no.124 The
original lease did not contemplate protection against this “internal”
drainage, and an assignment by the lessor could increase the duty on
the lessee.125 However, Williams and Meyers notes that at least one
author has felt this position to be entailed by the very concept of the
divisibility of lease obligations.126
The reality may be that the concept of lease division is not and
cannot be a completely consistent doctrine. There are inevitable
contradictions that prevent a totally consistent result across each
issue. Such appears to be the case here. If all the obligations are
divided and the divided tracts represent separate leaseholds, the
covenant to protect against drainage should inure to each separate
tract or depth interval. That is, there can be claims for internal
drainage in a horizontally divided lease.
Rather than ask what the “correct” answer is, perhaps courts
should instead simply look for the most pragmatic solution. The fact
that the original lease language did not contemplate “internal”
drainage should not be determinative. Instead, the potential for a
multiplication of the lessee’s duty with each assignment by the
original lessee should be the focus. From a practical standpoint, the
lessee has an alternative means of satisfying or avoiding a demand
to prevent drainage other than drilling a set-off well: the lessee can
request unitization.127 A unitization order will ordinarily require a
finding that the well is draining the unit acreage, but not acreage
outside the unit.128 In practice, the order will usually satisfy the
123. Contra MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 106, at § 409.3, which suggest
that these parties are jointly and severally liable for the full amount of drainage.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Hiram H. Lesar, Divisibility of Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, 25 KY. L.J. 142, 162 (1937)).
127. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt. (2000); Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
163 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007).
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drainage covenant, regardless of whether the unit order is accurate.
In a scenario where the divided tracts are actually near enough that
spacing regulations are at issue, unitization would almost certainly
be granted. Thus, arguably, there is a duty to prevent so-called
internal drainage in a divided lease. From a practical standpoint,
however, such a duty will be confined to a very narrow set of
circumstances, and such cases can be dealt with on their facts.
C. Marketing
The duty to exercise diligence in securing a market is made up
of two components: (1) the duty to make diligent efforts to market
any production; and (2) the duty to obtain the best price for that
production.129 This covenant is generally applicable to gas rather
than oil because of the relative ease of securing such a market for
oil.130
Based on the basic principles set forth already, the application of
this duty to a divided lease is fairly straightforward: the obligation
should be separately imposed on each segregated tract, so that each
partial assignor or assignee is responsible for marketing only to the
extent of his control of the leased premises. If A can only produce
and market from Tract 1, he is not responsible for the failure of B to
market from Tract 2. The rationale would hold with equal force for a
lease divided by depth, strata, or substance. In the hypothetical
scenario of a lease divided by depth, it seems obvious that a party
with rights vested in only a certain depth interval should not face
forfeiture of his lease interest simply because the holder of the
another depth interval failed to properly market its production. The
same rationale, of course, would apply to a lease divided by
substance.
D. Surface Restoration
Louisiana law on surface restoration is in a period of rapid
change, evolving in response to a number of statutory and public
policy considerations.131 To state it briefly, only the following can
be said safely: an implied covenant to restore the surface of the
leased property to pre-lease conditions after the cessation of
operations exists under Mineral Code article 122 (which sets forth
the lessee’s duty to act as a reasonably prudent operator); however,
129. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 175 (La. 1992).
130. John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the
New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 809–10 (1976).
131. A full account of this transformation is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the exact scope of that obligation is unknown.132 Some restoration
obligations seem obvious. For example, filling in pits and removing
surface tanks and equipment are to be expected from a prudent
operator—but the resolution of other issues is less clear.
After the extensive damages award in the famous legacy case of
Corbello v. Iowa Production,133 the legislature enacted Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:2015.1 in 2003, establishing procedures
for the remediation of usable groundwater.134 The legislature
expanded the remediation procedures in 2006 with Act 312, which
set forth processes to regulate the remediation of well sites; Act 312
was later brought into the Revised Statutes as Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 30:29.135 In 2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that, in Terrebonne v. Castex Energy, Inc.,136 Mineral Code
article 122 did not impose an implied duty to restore or remediate
the leased property to the pre-lease condition, absent proof that the
lessee had exercised his rights unreasonably or excessively.137 Thus,
it was thought the obligation to restore the surface was only due
under an express lease provision. However, subsequently, in Marin
v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,138 the Court stated:
In our view, the duty to remediate oilfield containment exists
under the prudent operator standard of the Mineral Code by
virtue of our holding in Castex, and it certainly exists under
the Civil Code. The holding in Castex merely recognized
that in the absence of unreasonableness or excessiveness, the
lessee has a duty to restore the surface minus normal wear
and tear. Where the lessee has operated unreasonably or
excessively . . . the lessee has additional obligations. . . . 139
In 2013, the court went further in State v. Louisiana Land and
Exploration140 and decided that a court could make a damage award
for a remediation claim in excess of the amount required under
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29, even in the absence of an
express lease provision providing for such excess damages.141

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
2005).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

LA. MIN. CODE art. 122.
Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (2013).
La. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2013).
Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La.
Id. at 797.
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234 (La. 2010).
Id. at 259–60.
State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038 (La. 2013).
Id. at 1054.
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The relevance of these recent decisions to lease division is not
entirely clear. There have not yet been enough cases decided to
determine the respective restoration obligations of partial assignors
and assignees after a lease has been divided. A partial assignee of
one tract should not be held liable for a remediation claim relating to
a tract in which he never held rights. On the other hand, an assignor
who divested himself of rights to a certain tract on which operations
had been conducted prior to assignment probably will bear some
responsibility for a later remediation claim relating to preassignment operations on that tract, absent an express assumption of
liability for remediation by the assignee. Such a result would be
consistent with articles 128 and 129 of the Mineral Code and with
prior decisions that have held that all parties in the chain of title for a
particular piece of leased property can be joined as defendants.142
VII. CONCLUSION
The concept of lease division initially benefitted lessees who
were assigned discrete acreage of leased property. With a divided
lease, the failure of the partial assignee to make payments of delay
rentals (or the commission of some other default under the lease) did
not affect the rights of the lessee-assignor. More recently, the notion
has been used by lessors frustrated by inactivity on an assigned
portion of their leased premises—usually through the lessor’s
assertion that the assigned portion of the lease had to be separately
maintained. Obtaining a judgment that an assignment divided the
lease may result in a determination that there was an automatic
termination for failure to maintain the separate areas of a divided
lease. This remedy is attractive because of its relative simplicity. If
all divided tracts are, in fact, separately maintained, a lessor may
move to a cause of action based on a “failure to develop”: an
implied lease covenant under article 122 and a more onerous action
to bring. In article 122 cases, not only is a great deal more evidence
required to bring the action (and, therefore, more expense), but there
also remain a great many unanswered questions about how exactly
implied covenants are enforced and about what exactly the remedy
is for a breach of an implied covenant.
If the assignor and assignee of the lessee’s interest under a
mineral lease receive the benefit of limiting their liability to the
lessor to the portion of the lease they own, it logically and equitably
follows that each post-assignment segment of the lease must be
142. But see Wagoner v. Chevron USA Inc., 55 So. 3d 12 (La. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that a landowner has no right of action over damage to his property
sustained prior to his acquisition of the property).
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treated as a separate lease for purpose of lease maintenance. Further,
our law should treat an assignment of discrete depth intervals as a
division of the lease with the same effect as a division by surface
acreage. Division by substance, though rare, should be subject to the
same rule. The basis for such a doctrine exists in our case law, and
the courts should recognize and apply the doctrine liberally in cases
where lease covenants and assignment provisions require the
lessee’s interest to be treated as divided for purposes of performance
of lease covenants post-assignment. The vast majority of lessors
have no control over the partial assignment of their lease; the
division of the lease is initiated by the lessee for the benefit of
lessees. Some protection of the lessor’s interest therefore seems
warranted and desirable for the public interest.

